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POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESSIVE, 
TRANS-DOCTRINAL LEGAL REFORM 
AISHA I. SAAD* 
Abstract: Kent Greenfield’s Corporations Are People Too (And They Should 
Act Like It) reclaims the legal theory of corporate personhood from the con-
servative right and champions it for the progressive left. Greenfield argues 
that corporate personhood, properly construed, can further progressive goals 
by limiting certain corporate powers, increasing corporate accountability, and 
enabling corporate management to govern in the interests of all stakeholders. 
Greenfield advances a progressive account of corporate personhood and elab-
orates its implementation in constitutional law and in corporate law. This 
symposium response extends Greenfield’s conception of corporate person-
hood to related questions in securities law and tort law. This is a first step in-
tended to advance a legal reform project that further translates corporate per-
sonhood into a coherent doctrine that reaches across U.S. law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The claim that “corporations are people” has incited fiery debate 
across the political spectrum. The conservative right brandishes corporate 
personhood as a victory for the free market whereas the progressive left 
attacks the notion as an affront to democratic accountability. In a compel-
ling reformulation of this familiar narrative, Kent Greenfield’s Corpora-
tions Are People Too claims corporate personhood as a progressive objec-
tive.1 He takes as his starting point the presumption that corporations should 
be good for society, and argues that embracing corporate personhood actual-
ly advances this agenda. 
Greenfield has been a leading voice in progressive corporate law for 
over two decades.2 Long before critiques of shareholder primacy became 
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 1 See KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE 
IT) (2018). 
 2 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 
(1998); Kent Greenfield, The Third Way: Beyond Shareholder or Board Primacy, 37 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 749 (2014); Kent Greenfield, There’s a Forest in Those Trees: Teaching About the Role 
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mainstream,3 Greenfield was highlighting the failures of American corpo-
rate law and advocating for corporate decision making that is stakeholder-
focused and that governs in the interests of a corporation’s plural constitu-
encies.4 Once again, his newest book takes a bold position, claiming the 
controversial notion of “corporate personhood” from conservatives and 
championing it for progressives.5 
Corporate personhood properly construed, Greenfield argues, advances 
progressive goals by limiting certain corporate powers,6 increasing corpo-
rate accountability,7 and enabling corporate management to govern in the 
                                                                                                                           
of Corporations in Society, 32 GA. L. REV. 1011 (2000). Greenfield’s 2006 book, The Failure of 
Corporate Law, offered a compelling counter-narrative to the then-prevailing law and economics 
account of the corporation. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006) [hereinafter GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF COR-
PORATE LAW]. He went beyond the principal-agent problem at the center of mainstream corporate 
law scholarship to outline key failures of corporate law including costly externalities, the absence 
of corporate commitment to communities, shareholder primacy at the expense of other stakehold-
ers, and short-termism. Id. at 1–2. He sketched out possibilities for reforming the American corpo-
ration to make it “more rational, democratic, accountable, and law-abiding.” Id. at 416. Greenfield 
argued that a public conception of corporate law should replace the current private conception, 
and took direct aim at the canonical notion of shareholder supremacy. Id. at vii. In the years since, 
these once fringe arguments have become part of the mainstream scholarly and popular discourse. 
 3 Recent statements from the business and finance community evidence changing expecta-
tions of the modern corporation and its obligations to the public. In his 2018 and 2019 annual 
letters to investors, Larry Fink, the CEO and Chairman of the world’s largest investment fund, 
declared his firm’s commitment to building “a better framework for serving all . . . stakeholders,” 
asserting that “[p]rofits are in no way inconsistent with purpose.” Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Letter 
to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/hk/en/insights/
larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/4QHF-YNL2]; Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs: 
Purpose & Profit, BLACKROCK (2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/
larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/J29M-QY5K]. In August 2019, nearly 200 CEOs of some of 
the country’s largest companies signed on to a Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation disavow-
ing the long-enshrined principle of shareholder primacy, and instead committing themselves to lead-
ing their companies “for the benefit of all stakeholders.” Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose 
of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’ BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 
19, 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corp-
oration-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans [https://perma.cc/7CKN-QCCW]. The 
next month, The Financial Times announced a major reorientation with the release of its “New 
Agenda” and mission to “encourage business leaders to . . . promote stronger corporate purpose.” 
FT Sets the Agenda with New Brand Platform, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2019), https://aboutus.ft.com/
en-gb/announcements/ft-sets-the-agenda-with-new-brand-platform/ [https://perma.cc/7WUY-Z9JY]. 
Its editor, Lionel Barber, noted that the “liberal capitalist model . . . has come under strain, par-
ticularly the focus on maximizing profits and shareholder value,” and advanced that “[t]he long-
term health of free enterprise capitalism will depend on delivering profit with purpose.” Lionel 
Barber, From the Editor, FIN. TIMES, https://aboutus.ft.com/en-gb/new-agenda/ [https://perma.
cc/2WKQ-W433]. Consensus is building around the conclusion that shareholder primacy is dead. 
 4 See generally GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW, supra note 2. 
 5 See GREENFIELD, supra note 1. 
 6 Id. at 9–11. 
 7 Id. at 11–12. 
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interests of all stakeholders.8 He advances a framework for determining 
which constitutional rights should be granted to corporations that is based 
on an analysis of the corporation’s objectives and an evaluation of the right 
in question.9 He further elaborates a vision of corporate law reform that in-
corporates a stakeholder-focused model of corporate governance.10 
Greenfield’s rejection of shareholder primacy and embrace of stake-
holder theory open up new opportunities for orienting corporate governance 
in line with a progressive agenda. His trailblazing work unpacks constitu-
tional and corporate law questions and offers answers to them. A fully de-
veloped legal regime that realizes the possibilities of progressive corporate 
personhood, however, will require reforms that extend to other legal areas. 
Part I of this symposium response begins by examining how Greenfield has 
defined and defended personhood in constitutional law and in corporate 
law.11 Part II extends his pragmatic approach to corporate personhood be-
yond these two legal domains and considers its implications for securities 
law and tort law as additional examples for developing a progressive legal 
account of corporate personhood.12 
I. DEFENDING THE CORPORATE “PERSON” IN CONSTITUTIONAL  
AND CORPORATE LAW 
In Corporations Are People Too, Kent Greenfield deploys the notion of 
personhood to signify different, yet complementary, interpretations of the 
corporate entity.13 His elaboration of personhood in the corporate context is 
pragmatic, focusing on the functions and objectives of the corporation ra-
ther than beginning with a historical or philosophical genealogy of person-
hood. When discussing corporate personhood in constitutional law, Green-
field advances three key features of corporate persons: 1) they are legally 
separate entities who “can sue, be sued, enter into contracts, own property, 
buy stuff, and sell stuff,” 2) they are “made up of people,” and 3) they are 
“holders of constitutional rights.”14 Personhood makes corporations more 
accountable to the public by preventing shareholders from attributing their 
religious beliefs to the companies they own,15 providing a limit on govern-
ment power and granting corporations standing to assert their due process 
                                                                                                                           
 8 Id. at 27. 
 9 See id. at 19. 
 10 See id. at 209–14. 
 11 See infra notes 14–29 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 30–46 and accompanying text. 
 13 See GREENFIELD, supra note 1. 
 14 Id. at 2–3. 
 15 Id. at 9–11. 
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rights when those rights are relevant to their economic purpose,16 and 
providing the public a “deep pocket to sue” when harmed.17 Greenfield’s 
framework for determining the limits of corporate personhood in constitu-
tional law derives from the premise that “corporations should receive the 
rights necessarily incidental to serving [their] economic purpose and should 
not receive those that are not germane to that purpose.”18 
Greenfield methodically reviews some of the key legal challenges to 
corporate personhood in constitutional law. He notes that cases concerning 
corporate constitutional rights can be generally classified as easy, medium, 
or hard. For “easy” legal cases, he argues that corporations should obvious-
ly have constitutional rights. These cases concern checks on government 
power like protection from uncompensated takings under the Fifth Amend-
ment and procedural due process protections against capricious governmen-
tal acts.19 More complicated cases in the “medium” and “hard” categories 
concern criminal procedure. These include cases dealing with the Fourth 
Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. For this class of 
cases, determining whether a right should extend to a corporate person must 
take into account “[t]he difference between the public nature of corpora-
tions and the private . . . nature of humans . . . .”20 Greenfield identifies the 
most difficult category of questions as those concerning “equality, religion, 
and fundamental rights.”21 For these questions, he argues, “we need to look 
at the purpose of the right in question and ask whether such purpose is fur-
thered by extending it to corporations.”22 Cutting through all these cases of 
varying complexities is a focus on the corporation’s purpose. Greenfield 
argues that a corporation should enjoy only those rights that advance its 
purpose.23 
Greenfield claims that although progressives have been trying to limit 
corporate rights through constitutional law, corporate law is in fact better 
suited to achieving that goal.24 In the corporate law context, he once again 
advocates for expanding corporate personhood as the solution for dealing 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Id. at 62, 66–69. 
 17 Id. at 11–12. 
 18 Id. at 62. “[W]e need to look at the purpose of the right in question and ask whether such 
purpose is furthered by extending it to corporations.” Id. at 103. 
 19 Id. at 70–74. 
 20 Id. at 74–75. 
 21 Id. at 81. 
 22 Id. at 103. 
 23 See id. at 19–20. 
 24 Id. at 170 (“The best hope for constraining corporate power and legitimizing corporations’ 
participation in the public square is not an adjustment in constitutional doctrine but an adjustment 
to corporate governance within corporate law.”). 
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with negative corporate externalities.25 When discussing personhood in cor-
porate law, Greenfield uses the term to capture a decision-making rationali-
ty that is complex, self-aware, and socially conscious. The ideal corporate 
citizen “owe[s] a robust set of duties to society and to stakeholders that go 
beyond shareholder primacy.”26 Greenfield advances that this rationality 
allows for “better corporate decision making,” and reduces economic ine-
quality and “short-termism.”27 In this context, Greenfield’s discussion of 
personhood sets out the boundaries of the corporation’s proper constituency, 
that is, the people who make up the corporate entity and who have legiti-
mate claims to its benefits. Greenfield argues that shareholder primacy is 
too narrow to capture the legitimate agents and beneficiaries of the corpora-
tion ,28 but does not provide a clear theory for determining where those 
boundaries should lie instead. Further development of corporate personhood 
in corporate law will have to answer this question. A corporation’s more 
obvious or “easy” constituents might include its employees and representa-
tives from the community where it is based. Beyond that, however, defining 
the parameters of a corporate citizen’s accountability becomes more chal-
lenging. If the corporate citizen is expected to be responsible to its neigh-
bors, for example, what does this mean in the age of globalization and the 
multinational corporation? What defines and/or limits the corporate per-
son’s footprint? How should corporate subsidiaries be accounted for? 
Greenfield’s assertion of corporate personhood opens the door to such ques-
tions, but further theoretical and doctrinal development will be required to 
arrive at a more fully-fledged characterization of the progressive corporate 
person. 
II. TRANSLATING CORPORATE PERSONHOOD ACROSS LEGAL DOCTRINE 
A shift from shareholder primacy to stakeholder theory promises a new 
vision of corporate governance that is more aligned with progressive con-
cern for the public interest. Such a move is only the beginning of a legal 
reform project concerned with the corporation’s personhood. This endeavor 
will require critical development of key questions within other doctrinal 
areas that, together, might enable the progressive orientation of the corpora-
tion that Greenfield has been promoting for decades. 
Greenfield’s framework envisions a new construct of personhood cen-
tered on the corporation’s purpose, granting to it those rights that further its 
purpose and limiting those that do not. It also develops a secondary ques-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See id. at 214–23. 
 26 Id. at 208. 
 27 Id. at 214–23. 
 28 See id. at 186–207. 
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tion concerning the corporation’s agents and beneficiaries—who makes up 
the corporation?29 This section attempts to extend Greenfield’s progressive 
corporate personhood and to sketch out some of the legal questions it im-
plies using examples from securities law and tort law. 
A. Corporate Personhood and Securities Law 
A conceptualization of corporate personhood that moves away from 
shareholder primacy presents some unique considerations for securities law. 
If, to answer the constitutional law questions, we start by addressing “what 
the corporation is for,” and to answer the corporate law questions we start 
by addressing “who the corporation acts for,” then to answer securities law 
questions we have to start by addressing “who the corporation speaks to.” 
This question goes to the heart of the securities disclosure regime and its 
founding objectives. 
Mandatory securities disclosure in the United States originated in the 
wake of the 1929 stock market crash. At the time, many perceived that in-
vestors’ uninformed speculation in securities had provoked the crash.30 The 
Securities Act was promulgated in 1933 with the purpose of balancing 
asymmetry in the amount and quality of information available to managers 
versus that available to investors.31 It required companies to disclose “mate-
rial” facts to investors in order to enable informed decision making during 
the issuance and registration of securities.32 The Securities Exchange Act 
(SEA), promulgated in the following year, established the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and charged it with mandating and overseeing peri-
odic reporting by publicly traded companies.33 If the architecture of the 
SEA and the securities disclosure regime aims to protect investors’ interests, 
then a stakeholder theory of the firm requires revisiting the audience for 
corporate disclosures. 
A corporation’s legitimate constituency is comprised of the stakehold-
ers whose interests inform management’s decisions. If corporate manage-
ment governs to maximize shareholder interest, it follows that “material” 
disclosures would concern financial performance and would be communi-
cated to an investor audience. If, however, corporate management makes 
decisions in the interest of a broader constituency, then the legal definition 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See GREENFIELD, supra note 1, at 187–89.  
 30 Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based Approach to Securities 
Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV 1313, 1322 (2018). 
 31 The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, SEC (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/
answers/about-lawsshtml.html [https://perma.cc/3F42-BVWB]. 
 32 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d-1(c) (2018). 
 33 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2018); Haeberle & Hender-
son, supra note 30; The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 31. 
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and scope of materiality must correspond accordingly. Early versions of 
these considerations can already be found in recent securities litigation con-
cerning corporate environmental, social, and governance disclosures.34 A 
more ambitious foray into progressive corporate personhood must engage 
directly with the purposes of the securities regime. 
B. Corporate Personhood and Tort Law 
In tort law, corporate personhood raises questions concerning the types 
of harms for which the corporation is liable, including the corporate per-
son’s obligation to broader society and the types of harms that are attributa-
ble to the corporate person.35 Such classic tort law questions will have to be 
revisited and revised through the lens of a corporate personhood agenda. 
Tort doctrine has grappled with the unique challenges and opportuni-
ties presented by the modern corporation, especially during periods of dra-
matic industrial and commercial transition. The twentieth century, for ex-
ample, saw major industrial shifts to mass manufacturing and a changing 
relationship between companies and consumers. These shifts spawned doc-
trinal innovations like market share liability and strict liability, which re-
conceptualized the public role and responsibility of corporations in bearing 
the costs of product-related injury.36 Market share liability allowed plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See, e.g., Caitlin Ajax & Diane Strauss, Corporate Sustainability Disclosures in American 
Case Law: Purposeful or Mere “Puffery”?,45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 703 (2019). Ajax and Strauss 
observe the growing popularity of consumer claims and securities litigation involving “sustaina-
bility disclosures . . . by companies.” Id. These cases are premised on an understanding that corpo-
rate ESG disclosures have become material and, as a consequence, legally actionable under con-
sumer law and securities law. See id. 
 35 See, e.g., Benjamin Ewing, The Structure of Tort Law, Revisited: The Problem of Corpo-
rate Responsibility, 8 J. TORT L. 1, 20 (2015) (“Even if tort law in principle could embody special 
interpersonal norms of responsibility, the contemporary corporate form may routinely undermine, 
or at least substantially complicate, its ability to do so. . . . It is not clear, in the absence of argu-
ment, whether corporations are or can be the kinds of moral agents to whom notions like attribu-
tive responsibility apply.”). 
 36 Market share liability, for example, appeared in the case of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories. 
607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980). In that case, plaintiffs brought class action claims against a group 
of companies that all produced the same drug. In bringing their claims, plaintiffs could not trace 
the specific drug ingested to a specific manufacturer. The Supreme Court of California held that 
plaintiffs could hold manufacturers collectively liable, with each company bearing liability for the 
aggregate judgment in accordance with its proportionate market share. Id. (“The presence in the 
action of a substantial share of the appropriate market also provides a ready means to apportion 
damages among the defendants. Each defendant will be held liable for the proportion of the judg-
ment represented by its share of that market unless it demonstrates that it could not have made the 
product which caused plaintiff’s injuries.”); see also Richard Kaye, Annotation, “Concert of Ac-
tivity,” “Alternate Liability,” “Enterprise Liability,” or Similar Theory as Basis for Imposing 
Liability upon One or More Manufacturers of Defective Uniform Product, in Absence of Identifi-
cation of Manufacturer of Precise Unit or Batch Causing Injury, 63 A.L.R. Fed. 5th 195, 195 
(1998) (“The bar has therefore created new theories of collective liability potentially aimed at 
I.-28 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
to hold product manufacturers liable by recovering damages in proportion 
to a manufacturer or manufacturers’ total market share, even where the spe-
cific producer of a particular product could not be determined.37 In advanc-
ing theories of strict liability, drafters of the Second Restatement of Torts 
reasoned that corporations were the best positioned parties to redistribute 
the costs of accidental injury as a sort of public insurer,38 and that they 
should therefore bear liability based on policy grounds.39 Courts embraced 
                                                                                                                           
holding an individual manufacturer, or an entire industry, responsible for products that cannot 
easily be traced back to the actual manufacturer.”). Similarly, strict liability doctrine emerged as a 
response to new dynamics between product manufacturers and consumers. Judge Traynor’s con-
currence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. highlighted the role that mass production has had in 
transforming the relationship between buyers and sellers, noting that as mass production has re-
placed handicrafts, the relationship between producers and consumers has resulted in consumers 
no longer being able to evaluate products on their own. See 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Tray-
nor, J., concurring) (“As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets 
and transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a prod-
uct has been altered. Manufacturing processes, frequently valuable secrets, are ordinarily either 
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public. The consumer no longer has means or skill 
enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even when it is not contained in a 
sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers 
to build up confidence by advertising and marketing devices such as trade-marks.”). Later, in 
1963, Judge Traynor cited his own concurrence in Escola to reference the policy justification to 
imposing strict liability, which is to distribute the costs of injury from defective products to the 
product manufacturers rather than the consumers. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 377 
P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) (“We need not recanvass the reasons for imposing strict liability on the 
manufacturer. They have been fully articulated in the cases cited above. The purpose of such lia-
bility is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the man-
ufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are power-
less to protect themselves.”). 
 37 See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prod. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 
593, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Under market-share liability, when a plaintiff is unable to identify the 
specific manufacturer of a fungible product that caused her injury, the plaintiff may recover dam-
ages from a manufacturer or manufacturers in proportion to each manufacturer’s share of the total 
market for the product.”). 
 38 The reporters appointed were William Prosser and John Wade who were aided by an advi-
sory committee comprised of prominent judges, law professors, and practitioners, including, 
among others, academic members Fleming James, Jr. of Yale and W. Page Keeton of Texas. See, 
e.g., Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability, 34 TEX. L. REV. 192 (1955) (“In modern context, 
strict liability for accidental harms tends to distribute fairly equitably the inevitable casualties of 
enterprise.”); see also, e.g., Page Keeton, Products Liability—Liability Without Fault and the 
Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 859 (1963). Keeton identified risk spreading as one 
possible theoretical basis for imposing strict liability on a manufacturer: “[i]f . . . the underlying 
basis for the imposition of strict liability is the notion that the manufacturer is a better risk bearer 
because of his capacity to shift losses incurred from the use of the products to the consuming pub-
lic generally . . . then the problem is one of allocating between the particular user and the manu-
facturer losses resulting from the various risks or hazards that inhere in the use of a product.” 
Keeton, supra, at 859. 
 39 See, e.g., Page Keeton, Products Liability—Current Developments, 40 TEX. L. REV. 193, 
205–06 (1961) (“[T]he cases imposing liability are doing so on policy grounds, the notion being 
that ‘with mammoth accumulation of capital and large volume of sales comes an increasing facili-
ty for risk distribution without strain.’”) (quoting Millard H. Ruud, Manufacturers’ Liability for 
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this rationale, highlighting the unique features of mass producers like their 
capitalized structures and the greater bargaining power they maintain in re-
lation to consumers.40 Progressive corporate personhood in the tort law do-
main will need to reengage questions about how to distribute the risks and 
costs of corporate-driven development fairly and effectively, whether in the 
context of product-related accidents, systemic risks like climate change, or 
public health crises like the opioid epidemic. 
In recent years, public-interest litigation efforts have been attempting 
to wield public nuisance law as a cost-spreading mechanism for public 
harms by targeting the deep pockets of corporations. Recent tort litigation 
concerning the costs of the opioid crisis and of climate change on state and 
local governments demonstrates a public appetite for expanding the scope 
of corporate liability to cover systemic or societal harms using broader in-
terpretations of public nuisance doctrine. In 2018, a number of local gov-
ernments and cities including San Francisco, Oakland, and New York filed 
public nuisance lawsuits against fossil fuel companies for the costs of cli-
mate change.41 Although their public nuisance theory was ultimately not 
successful, the same theory has recently led to legal victories against corpo-
rate defendants in the context of the opioid crisis.42 An Oklahoma court 
ruled against Johnson & Johnson in a case concerning the pharmaceutical 
company’s role in the public health crisis. The presiding judge found that it 
                                                                                                                           
Representations Made by Their Sales Engineers to Subpurchasers, 8 UCLA L. REV. 251, 280 
(1961)). 
 40 The case law of at least thirty states makes specific reference to mass-producers, distin-
guishing them from small-scale manufacturers, and noting the public policy objectives of holding 
them strictly liable. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co. v. Miss. Valley Structural Steel Co., 636 F. 
Supp. 1100, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (“The parties were undoubtedly of greatly different bargain-
ing strength, the goods and their specifications were not bargained for but instead were mass pro-
duced, loss shifting from the consumer to the manufacturer would have the beneficial effect of 
improving design and manufacture of the goods, and the manufacturers could more easily shift the 
loss over society as a whole.”); Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373, 382 
(Iowa 1972) (“Recovery under a theory of strict liability in tort results from a public policy deci-
sion that protects the consumer from the inevitable risks of damage or harm brought about by 
mass production and complex marketing conditions. Thus, strict liability in tort serves a necessary 
purpose.”); Melody Home Mfg. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 360–61 (Tex. 1987); Ernest W. Hahn, 
Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1979); Webb v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 
692 A.2d 343, 346 (Vt. 1996) (“[S]trict products liability is justified on the ground that manufac-
turers are in the best position to spread the cost of injury resulting from defective products by 
passing it on to consumers as a cost of doing business.”). 
 41 John Schwartz, Judge Dismisses Suit Against Oil Companies Over Climate Change Costs, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/climate/climate-change-lawsuit-
san-francisco-oakland.html?auth=login-email&login=email [https://perma.cc/RH65-NGLW]. 
 42 See Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Here’s Why Lawyers Suing Oil Companies Are Follow-
ing the Opioid Cases, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/power
post/paloma/the-energy-202/2019/09/03/the-energy-202-here-s-why-lawyers-suing-oil-companies-
are-following-the-opioid-cases/5d6d4c86602ff171a5d7338f/ [https://perma.cc/4JUN-ETEY]; Schwartz, 
supra note 41. 
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had breached state public nuisance law,43 providing an example for thou-
sands of similar lawsuits.44 A key challenge to these public nuisance cases 
argues that such legal theories unfairly conscript companies to cover the 
costs of complex and multifactorial social problems.45 Those advocating for 
an expanded interpretation of public nuisance, however, attribute greater 
liability to corporations by virtue of their scale, the magnitude of their con-
tribution to the public crisis in question, and their ability to bear the expense 
of abating the consequential costs.46 
CONCLUSION 
Embracing corporate personhood for progressive ends has wide-
reaching implications for contemporary American jurisprudence. Kent Green-
field has laid the cornerstone of an ambitious and timely legal reform pro-
ject by developing a framework for conceptualizing corporate personhood 
in constitutional and in corporate law. This symposium response has drawn 
the broad strokes of the types of questions that progressive corporate per-
sonhood implies for securities and tort law. Extending this project to other 
legal domains will require identifying and addressing relevant questions 
that personhood presents for established doctrine. It will be the charge of 
progressive legal scholars to take up Greenfield’s mantle and further trans-
                                                                                                                           
 43 Jan Hoffman, Johnson & Johnson Ordered to Pay $572 Million in Landmark Opioid Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/26/health/oklahoma-opioids-
johnson-and-johnson.html [https://perma.cc/YE5R-K5X6]. 
 44 See id.; Brian Mann, Purdue Pharma Reaches Tentative Deal to Settle Thousands of Opi-
oid Lawsuits, NPR (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/11/759967610/purdue-pharma-
reaches-tentative-deal-to-settle-thousands-of-opioid-lawsuits [https://perma.cc/K8GW-528R]. 
 45 See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson to Appeal Flawed Opioid Judgment in Oklahoma, JOHNSON 
& JOHNSON (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.jnj.com/johnson-johnson-to-appeal-flawed-opioid-
judgment-in-oklahoma [https://perma.cc/N6H4-HM3D] (“ʻJanssen did not cause the opioid crisis 
in Oklahoma, and neither the facts nor the law support this outcome,ʼ said Michael Ullmann, Ex-
ecutive Vice President, General Counsel, Johnson & Johnson. ‘We recognize the opioid crisis is a 
tremendously complex public health issue and we have deep sympathy for everyone affected.’”). 
 46 See, e.g., Complaint for Public Nuisance at 5, People v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370, 
2017 Cal. Super. LEXIS 6139 (Sept. 29, 2017) (“Defendants are substantial contributors to the 
public nuisance of global warming that is causing injury to the People and thus are jointly and 
severally liable. Defendants’ cumulative production of fossil fuels over many years places each of 
them among the top sources of global warming pollution in the world. . . . The People seek an 
order requiring Defendants to abate the global warming-induced sea level rise nuisance to which 
they have contributed by funding an abatement program to build sea walls and other infrastructure 
that is urgently needed to protect human safety and public and private property in San Francisco. 
The People do not seek to impose liability on Defendants for their direct emissions of greenhouse 
gases and do not seek to restrain Defendants from engaging in their business operations. This case 
is, fundamentally, about shifting the costs of abating sea level rise harm—one of global warming’s 
gravest harms—back onto the companies. After all, it is Defendants who have profited and will 
continue to profit by knowingly contributing to global warming, thereby doing all they can to help 
create and maintain a profound public nuisance.”).  
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